The LA urban rebellion erupted as the result of a perceived lack of justice. It was a visible display of frustration and anger spilling into and taking over the very lives of those who suffer the injustices – a community consuming itself no less violently as it has been scorched by the wider, dominant community. But the doors have been left ajar for redress. Community organizers will rightly take up their positions to help rid these communities of injustices. What started as an issue of injustice or the lack thereof, will end with renewed efforts trying to attain it. But a legitimate question arises: what justice and for whom?

Current events have re-emphasized what has long been known that the poor and people of color are not treated justly under the present political system. Regardless of legislation and social movements, these communities suffer the hob-nailed boot on their necks. A valid question is how much will organizing and legislation accomplish this time? ACORN was brought forth as a successful example of CO. However, its concept of justice was simply the appropriation and possible redistribution of power. This was found to be inadequate. A suggestion was made, based on Michael Perry’s exposition of the idea, to allow the free expression of religious beliefs in public discourse.

In moments of crisis people turn to moral and religious beliefs for answers and solace. The argument is that these beliefs – religious morality – need to be made available to the wider public. They need to be available at every moment. In short, through discourse and dialogue, our society needs an infusion from the deep well of morality lying in the different religious belief systems comprising the plurality of our society. It is thought, rightfully, I believe, that most religious beliefs are present ay a deeper level within people, therefore, more natural and sincere.

Though the whole range of issues is of great interest regarding the implementation of this and what it mean in a democracy, we shall focus only on the issue of justice. David Hollenbach has contributed both to the discussion of religion in the public sphere and on the concept of justice.[27]^,[28] From Hollenbach’s perspective, the two are intimately related. His elucidation of justice is the direct result of religious and theological reflection.

In “Religion and Political Life”, David Hollenbach fills in the gaps that were only alluded to throughout most of our discussion. He details three prominent positions in the current thinking on theories of justice. The first is a secular, liberal democratic position put forth by John Rawls[29] and radically extended by Richard Rorty.[30] The second position represents a liberal democratic attempt to accommodate religious beliefs. Kent Greenawalt has explored this avenue.[31] The third position represents a critique, both philosophically and theologically, of liberal democratic theory. It is an attempt to legitimize a greater public role for religious beliefs. This has been the position of Michael Perry[32], with elucidations by Robin Lovin[33]. David Hollenbach also writes from this position.[34]

The application of these issues to our discussion is obvious. While people may be crying I in the streets for justice, and organizers organizing for social justice, these theorists are attempting to define, in a meaningful way, what justice is or should be. Without some conception, without a long-term program to attain it, however, the people will always be crying in the streets. These three positions will be briefly presents. Then, in conclusion, Hollenbach’s conception of ‘justice as participation’ will be introduced.

John Rawls developed his theory of justice within the context of pluralism. He noted that liberal democracy developed out of the religious was of the sixteenth century. The peace, which followed the scourge of years of war was based on mutual tolerance, but was inherently unstable. Rawls describes the subsequent ordering of a more stable society as “an ‘overlapping consensus’ on a ‘reasonable political conception of justice’ for a pluralistic society.”[35]

Hollenbach relates that Rawls’ notion of overlapping consensus first, “supports a conception of justice that applies to a particular subject, namely the basic structure of a modern constitutional democracy.”[36] Apparently, this pertains only to a selection of social institutions, mainly the political, social, and economic structures. It is interesting to see what is to be excluded from this domain: family life, the organization of voluntary associations, and the internal governances of churches.[37]

If religion and politics are to be successfully merged in general to provide a transformative, emancipatory vision in a radically reworked democratic society, these excluded institutions cannot be left untouched. If one accepts the fact that people make and are made by their social systems and that the most impressionable and influential spheres of peoples’ lives are those being excluded, it becomes clear that these will be hotly contested terrains of influence. Once suffused primarily with folk tradition and religion, these spheres must be opened up to transformation also.

Returning to Rawls’ overlapping consensus, a second stage in its development is that “the conception of justice contained within it does not claim to be the whole of morality.”[38] Rawls is aware of the plurality of philosophical and theological systems, which embody comprehensive accounts of what is good, virtue, etc. Since there is no hope at reconciling these diverse positions, the concept of toleration is applied to philosophy also. He is quick to add that toleration should not be viewed as skepticism about or indifference to these different systems. Rather, there is no hope in resolving them politically. Consequently, he hopes that “diverse religious and philosophical traditions can find reasons within their overlapping belief systems for affirming the political conception of justice...”[39]

The second position has been based on the awareness that the political role of religion in our liberal democratic tradition demands greater scrutiny. While ultimately responding to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) and subsequent refinements, Bruce Ackerman and Kent Greenawalt have debated this issue between themselves. Ackerman ultimately concludes that religious premises must be excluded from political life.[40] Greenawalt undertook the challenge to examine the matter more carefully.

A more fundamental goal of Greenawalt’s study in the public sphere is to resolve the tension between liberal democracy and the participation of religion in the public sphere. As he sees it “government is legitimated by the consent of the governed and by its protection of basic rights.”[41] These rights are explicable in non-religious terms being based on natural rights. As such the government is given secular validation. This understanding of the secular roots of government implies a corollary: the government cannot and will not encourage religious beliefs or institutions. However, the fact that many people have religious beliefs, which influence the way in which they comport their public lives, is beyond doubt. On the face of it, this should not be problematic because “it is a central tenet of liberal democracy that people are free to develop their own values and, at least within limits, styles of life, they are free to express their views not only about political questions but about other human concerns.”[42] This is the apparent contradiction that Greenawalt addresses. In the end, his conclusion supports the type of theory proposed by Rawls. His reasoning is that “religious reasons should not be invoked wither to advocate or justify a public policy or law.”[43]

The third position advocating a public role for religious beliefs has been proposed by Michael Perry and other others. Since we have already been exposed to important aspects of Perry’s thought there is no need to review it here. Rather, using this perspective as a starting point, it is time to turn to Hollenbach’s presentation of ‘justice as participation’.

Hollenbach’s position emerges from the changes in Catholic tradition and several encyclicals since Vatican II. Foundational for our concerns for justice is the recognition that “persons can come to authentic humanity only through culture...”[44] It is only through culture that humans become free and establish moral norms. The effect of this acknowledgement of the importance of cultural activity in creating moral norms prepared the way for the acceptance of pluralism. This, in itself, creates additional problems ass the argument can slide into relativism - “the pluralism of reason and the constant danger of ideological and self-protective definitions are recognized.”[45] However, as Hollenbach relates, “Christian faith has no stake in defending a specific social model...unless this model either especially promotes or especially threatens the basic Christian ethical conviction concerning the normative character of social interdependence and reciprocal love.”[46]

The multiplicity of mutual claims in the public sphere reflected in the Church’s delineation of three types of justice. Briefly, there is commutative justice which “concerns the claims that exist in relations between individual and individual or between groups that are essentially private and non-political...It is rooted in the fundamental equality of persons...implying that if contracts or agreements are to be just, the [people] must be genuinely free.”[47]

The second type is distributive justice which “specifies the claim which all persons have to some share in those goods that are essentially public or social...they are not the property of any individual or class...for all members of society are at least indirectly involved in their production through membership in public society.”[48]

Finally, the third type is social justice. It “concerns institutionalized patterns of mutual action and interdependence that are necessary to bring about the realization of distributive justice...It refers to the obligations of all citizens to aid in the creation of patterns of societal organizations and activity that are essential both for the protection of minimal human rights and for the creation of mutuality and participation by all in social life...social justice is a political virtue.”[49]

Though analytically separate, these three types are interrelated. In the discourse of the tradition, they “remain indispensable for the specification of the claims of love” which are expressed as explicit demands.[50] But equally important, and bringing the discussion back to the original topic, “the Christian pursuit of justice will be action rooted in solidarity with all persons, especially the poor...” Furthermore, though not particular to Christians, as interpreted by tradition “these obligations of justice are religious obligations...”[51], thereby cementing the relationship between religious belief and public action.

Distilling the essence from this discussion, it is possible to re-ask the question that began this section: what kind of justice? Hollenbach contends that Rawls’ ‘justice as fairness’ is inadequate. It simply reflects his tolerant social vision which was found wanting. Instead, attention is drawn to Michael Walzer’s concept of ‘spheres of justice.’ Walzer is interested in respecting and preserving differences. This is accomplished by scrutinizing how people live their lives. From this analysis emerges several interesting points; namely, that human lives are divided into different spheres of activity, each with its own relationships. The kind of obligations one has depends on the kind of relationship.[52] Moreover, the glue holding the different spheres of justice together is contained in ‘membership’.

This last term resonates with meaning for our discussion throughout. It ties the elements of a person as individual to the group as community or society in an obligatory manner. “To be a person is to be a member of society, active with it in many ways through diverse sets of relationships...the meaning of justice rises from this link between personhood and social participation.”[53] This has been stated more unequivocally by a bishops’ letter:

Basic justice demands the establishment of minimum levels of participation in the life of the human community for all persons.[54]

This has radical implications for our economic and political systems. Directly related to the multiple themes of this paper, it advocates for the poor and the underclasses, in general. It is providing a framework for organizers to strengthen and revitalize those communities based on a political vision rooted in an ecumenical politics. By defining justice as participation inclusively, any system or solution attempting otherwise is both undemocratic and morally bankrupt. Excluding people from participation in human communities to the fullest of their capacities becomes an inhumane act.

It will be enough simply to exact and enact legislation to help the communities in LA. Rather, steps must be taken to ensure their integration into the wider community. By marginalizing them, as they are, the wider society is sending a message to the effect that they are less-than-human. It is at this juncture that the need for an ecumenical political dialogue based on the mutual and reciprocal belief in human dignity is found to be the greatest.

[27] David Hollenbach, “Religion and Political Life,” Theological Studies 52:1 (March 1991): 87-106.

[28] David Hollenbach, Justice, Peace & Human Rights (New York: Crossroad, 1988, 1990).

[29] John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971, 1977).

[30] Richard Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,: in Merrill D. Peterson and Robert C. Vaughan eds., The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom: Its Evolution and Consequences in American History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[31] Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[32] op. cit.

[33] Robin Lovin, “Perry, Naturalism, and Religion in Public,” Tulane Law Review 63 (1989).

[34] Hollenbach “Religion...”, pp. 87-88. The following section relies on D. Hollenbach’s account.

[35] ibid., p. 89.

[36] ibid., p. 89.

[37] ibid., p. 89.

[38] ibid., p. 89.

[39] ibid., pp. 89-90.

[40] ibid., p. 96.

[41] ibid., P. 96.

[42] ibid., P. 96.

[43] ibid., p.97.

[44] Hollenbach, Justice.... P. 24.

[45] ibid., p. 25.

[46] ibid., p. 25.

[47] ibid., p. 26.

[48] ibid., p. 26.

[49] ibid., p.27.

[50] ibid., p. 29.

[51] ibid., p. 31.

[52] ibid., p. 80.

[53] ibid., p. 82.

[54] ibid., p. 82.